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Introduction and summary
For months now, the U.S. auto industry has been mak-
ing front page news. The Big Three automakers con-
tinue to restructure and cut production capacity amid
ongoing market share losses. The debt of both Ford
and General Motors (GM) has been downgraded sub-
stantially below investment grade status. Some analysts
have even raised the possibility of bankruptcy for one
of the large Detroit-based carmakers. Related to the
market share losses by domestic producers and their
supplier base is a profound regional redistribution of
production activity.1
This article takes a long-term view regarding the
changing geography of the U.S. auto industry over the
past 25 years. Since 1979, Michigan alone has shed almost
one-third of its auto industry employment.2 During the
same period, southern states, such as Kentucky, Tennessee,
Alabama, and the Carolinas, more than tripled their
employment in the auto industry. Detroit has historically
been and continues to be the center of the U.S. motor
vehicle industry. Michigan is by far the state with the
greatest concentration of auto industry jobs in the coun-
try, with 35 percent of its manufacturing employment in
the auto sector (here, defined as the sector that involves
the assembly of light vehicles and the production of
motor vehicle parts). Indeed, the motor vehicle industry
continues to be concentrated in the Midwest: 47 percent
of motor vehicle employment resides in the industry’s
three core states of Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio.
Yet, several separate developments continue to
reshape the U.S. auto industry. In the late 1970s, do-
mestic vehicle producers began shutting down their
coastal vehicle assembly plants in response to the
changing economics of transportation costs associated
with serving the national market. In addition, there
was the arrival of the so-called transplants—production
facilities located in the U.S. but owned and operated
by foreign-headquartered companies, such as Honda
and Nissan. Since their arrival in the early 1980s,
these plants have gained 23 percent of U.S. light ve-
hicle sales. These foreign-owned plants, while locat-
ed in the center of the country, tend to be sited away
from where the Big Three have traditionally established
their assembly plants. Finally, domestic producers also
had to scale back operations as they lost 10 percentage
points of market share during the past decade to brands
and nameplates produced outside North America. The
combination of these trends, plus related developments
in the auto supplier sector, has noticeably changed the
face of the U.S. auto industry over the past 25 years.
In this article, we trace the changes in the foot-
print of the auto industry. We start in 1980 and track
the evolution of the auto industry’s geography through
2003. The early 1980s represents a key period of inter-
est as foreign-based auto assembly and supplier com-
panies started opening up production operations within
the U.S. The market share of transplants has been
growing quite steadily over the past 20 years. By uti-
lizing historical data on assembly plant locations, we
are able to compare spatial developments in this indus-
try during the 1980s and 1990s. In addition, we com-
pare changes in the location patterns of assembly and
supplier plants over each decade separately and across
the entire span of the two decades combined.
Literature
For many years, economists and economic geog-
raphers have tried to understand why economic activity3 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
is clustered (for example, see Krugman, 1991; Ellison
and Glaeser, 1997). A number of papers directly address
the geography of the auto industry. Of primary interest
is the relative location of assembly plants and supplier
plants. Also important is the location of suppliers rel-
ative to the assembly operations, as well as the loca-
tion of assembly plants relative to their customers.
In describing the location pattern of assembly
plants, Rubenstein (1992) reveals the rise and subse-
quent disappearance of the system of branch assem-
bly plants.3 In essence, Rubenstein explains, this is a
story of transportation cost economics, based on the
distance from assembly plants to the vehicle buying
public. A producer interested in serving the national
market is faced with the question of where to locate
its vehicle assembly plants to minimize the cost of
production. Production costs include the procurement
of parts and materials, as well as the distribution of
the final products to the dealers. In the case of bulky
consumer products, such as automobiles, the cost of
distribution is not trivial. Rubenstein shows that the
number of different models of cars and light trucks
has been growing substantially faster than the overall
market since the mid-1970s. This development re-
sulted in smaller production runs of individual models.
As a rule of thumb, today, an individual model supports
at most one assembly plant.4 To minimize the cost of
distribution of its output, these assembly plants need
to be located centrally relative to their market. Conse-
quently, assembly plants reconcentrated in the Midwest
and the South. However, the agglomeration among
assembly plants became less tight as newly sited plants
chose nontraditional locations.5
Several other papers investigate the location de-
cisions of auto supplier plants. Woodward (1992) and
Smith and Florida (1994) model the locations of for-
eign-owned auto supplier plants. They establish the
importance of highway transportation in choosing a
supplier plant location. Several papers utilize a detailed
plant-level data set on the auto supplier industry. All
of these papers focus on post-1990 supplier plant lo-
cation decisions. Klier, Ma, and McMillen (2004) di-
rectly compare the location decisions of domestically
owned and foreign-owned supplier plants. Klier and
McMillen (2005) estimate the clustering of auto sup-
plier plants, using a spatial probit estimator. In esti-
mating location choices of auto supplier plants since
1994, Klier (2005) confirms the importance of high-
way transportation as well as the proximity to assembly
plants. These last two papers cover only the past de-
cade of supplier plant location decisions. In addition,
they do not draw on the detailed historical data detail-
ing the evolving footprint of auto production since 1980.
Data and methodology
Underlying the analysis presented in this article
are two very detailed data sets. We compiled a histor-
ical data set on the operation of light vehicle assembly
plants.6 This data set covers the years 1980–2003. The
unit of observation is an assembly line. An assembly
line refers to the configuration of machinery that pro-
duces a finished vehicle from numerous parts and com-
ponents. While there are several ways to influence actual
output at a given assembly line, such as changing the
number of shifts or the line speed, the minimum effi-
cient scale of a modern vehicle assembly line operat-
ing with two shifts is around 200,000 units a year.
An assembly plant location can encompass mul-
tiple assembly lines. Thus, we are able to distinguish
different sizes of assembly plants. For example, when
Toyota opened its first assembly plant in the U.S. in
Georgetown, Kentucky, the plant had only one assembly
line. Within a few years of opening that plant, Toyota
decided to expand it by adding a second assembly line.
This expansion required the construction of addition-
al facilities at the site. Adding a second assembly line
essentially doubled the size of the assembly plant. Thus,
from the point of view of the suppliers, a second as-
sembly line represents approximately twice as much
business as before. Using assembly lines instead of
assembly plants as units of observation allows us to
recognize differences in scale across assembly plants.
Our data set accounts for the addition or deletion of
assembly lines on an annual frequency starting in 1980.
We base our analysis of supplier plant density on
data acquired from ELM International, a Michigan-
based vendor. Though not designed with research ap-
plications in mind, the ELM database is intended to
cover the entire North American auto industry. Data
are available at the plant and company levels. However,
plants producing primarily for the aftermarket are not
part of the database, nor are plants that produce ma-
chine tools or raw materials such as steel and paint.7
We use the ELM database from year-end 2003,
which provides 3,542 plant-level records. The data-
base includes information on a plant’s address, prod-
ucts, employment, parts produced, customer(s), union
status, and square footage. We performed a number of
operations to clean up the data. First, we cross-checked
records with state manufacturing directories to obtain
information on the plant’s age.8 We obtained informa-
tion on captive plants from Harbour Consulting (2003).
We also appended information on the nationality of
the company to the record of each plant from the ELM
company-level data. For the 150 largest supplier com-
panies, we cross-checked the accuracy and completeness
of ELM International’s plant listings—both the number4 2Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
of plants and their locations—with the individual com-
pany’s website whenever possible.9 The cross-checking
resulted in a net addition of 335 records. Finally, we
checked the accuracy of the employment for the largest
plants (those with more than 2,000 employees) by re-
viewing company websites or making phone calls to the
company. After these steps, the data set comprises 4,478
observations of auto supplier plants located in North
America, of which 3,416 are located in the U.S., 461
in Canada, and 601 in Mexico. To our knowledge, this
data set contains the most accurate description of the
North American auto supplier industry currently avail-
able. Our formal analysis draws only on the U.S. data.
One of our objectives in the empirical analysis is
to determine whether supplier plant location decisions
differ across the two most recent decades. The data
on supplier plants, however, represent only one cross
section—all supplier plants that were active at a particu-
lar point in time (in the year 2003). And yet, we have
data on the ages of these plants, and so, we can draw
inferences on the geographic distribution of supplier
plants in earlier years. Admittedly, these findings are
affected by survivor bias. For example, suppose that
some of the supplier plants that were active in the 1970s
in the Northeast shut down as the industry migrated
south, but supplier plants that were active in the South
BOX 1
Density measure
There are many ways to illustrate the concentration
of plants. The obvious choice seems to be to measure
the number of plants located within a county. Yet, while
county size does not vary greatly for the eastern United
States, this approach would be compromised by the
arbitrariness of county boundaries. Instead, we start
at the centroid of a county and draw a circumference
with a 50-mile radius. That way we can compare
identical geographic areas. Finally, because our pri-
mary interest is to represent local effects of agglom-
eration, we introduce a cubic function to give more
weight to plants near the center of a county.1
The specific measure we use is the tri-cube kernel
density measure. It is a standard kernel estimator. We
chose it because of the following properties: It mea-
sures the density of plants near each county i as a func-
tion of the distance between each plant j and the county
(note that plant locations are measured at the ZIP Code
level and county locations are measured by the coun-
ty centroid). For example, if there are 25 supplier plants
in a county and they are all located in the ZIP Code
that includes the county centroid, the term inside the
summation sign for that county turns out to be 1. In
that case the density Di represents the share of all plants
(J) in that county. That interpretation of the density
measure represents an upper bound. As plants are
located farther from the county centroid, their weight
in the density calculation is reduced. Plants that are
located farther away than the radial distance (which
in our case is set to 50 miles) do not affect the densi-
ty measure.
The density measure for each county is divided
by all observations of the same plants at that point in
time in the area of study (the eastern United States),
and the share is then multiplied by 100.
j = 1, …, J plants,
Di = density of plants around county i,
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1The density measure of assembly operations is calculated based on the
presence of assembly lines instead of assembly plants. We think of these
measures as essentially interchangeable. The advantage of utilizing
assembly lines as units of observation is that it allows us rather easily
to distinguish differences in the scale of assembly plant locations.
in the 1970s did not need to shut down. In this case,
using data on plants that were active in 2003 would
make it seem as if there were relatively more plants
down South in the 1970s than there really were.10
These data allow us to present detailed informa-
tion on the changing face of the U.S. auto industry. First,
we present a set of maps (figures 1 through 9) to illustrate
our findings.11 Then we discuss a formal modeling ef-
fort of the location decision of auto supplier plants.
All the maps on changes in the assembly and
supplier industry geography are based on a density
measure derived from the raw data. We explain the
density measure in more detail in box 1.
Evolution of the industry’s geography
Assembly lines
This section demonstrates the changing density
of assembly lines in the U.S. auto industry. The maps
focus on the eastern half of the United States, where
the vast majority of assembly lines are located. Each
map shows the distribution of the density measure
previously described as measured at a specific point
in time. The density is measured at the county level
with a radius of 50 miles from the county centroid.
Figure 1 shows the density of light vehicle assem-
bly lines in 1980. It shows the geography of 55 assembly5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
lines operational in that year. With the exception of
cluster H, which represents one Ford and two GM as-
sembly lines located in the Atlanta region, all assembly
lines are located in a fairly compact region that extends
north–south from the Twin Cities in Minnesota to Kan-
sas City, and from there all the way to the East Coast.
By far the highest density of assembly operations
is found in southeastern Michigan: Wayne, Oakland,
and Macomb counties are the only counties with a den-
sity value in double digits (incidentally, this is true at
all three points in time that are analyzed). Secondary
clusters, encompassing at least three assembly lines,
are located in southern Wisconsin and Chicago (C),
Kansas City (D), northern Ohio (I), Maryland (L),
and New York (M).12
During the 1980s, the number of assembly lines
on net increased by only one. Underlying this summa-
ry statistic, however, are much larger gross flows: 13
assembly lines opened and 12 assembly lines closed
in the region shown. Figure 2 depicts the density of
assembly lines in the year 1990. It specifically labels
the changes, that is, the assembly line openings (black
letters) and closures (orange letters) experienced dur-
ing the decade. New assembly locations at previously
unoccupied sites—so-called greenfield locations—
are outlined in black. Comparing figures 1 and 2, the
well-defined east–west auto region visible in 1980
begins to change in two major ways. The relative im-
portance of the East Coast as an assembly location is
being reduced by the closures of three assembly lines,
FIGURE 1
Assembly line density in 1980
Note: For further details, see the text and the appendix, table A1.
Sources: ELM International and assembly company websites.
FIGURE 2
Assembly line density in 1990
Note: For further details, see the text and the appendix, table A1.
Sources: ELM International and assembly company websites.
FIGURE 3
Assembly line density in 2003
Note: For further details, see the text and the appendix, table A1.
Sources: ELM International and assembly company websites.
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one each in Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachu-
setts. At the same time, the newly opened assembly
lines extend the area of auto assembly southward. The
majority of assembly lines opened during the decade
represent a filling in of previously unoccupied areas
in northern Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. In addition, the6 2Q/2006, Economic Perspectives
auto region is pulled farther south by the Saturn and
Nissan assembly operations opening in Tennessee (V),
as well as GM’s new assembly facility in Shreveport,
Louisiana (W). (See table A1 in the appendix for de-
tails on assembly line openings and closings.)
The emerging north–south extension of the assem-
bly region is reinforced during the 1990s and into the
present decade (see figure 3). The number of assem-
bly lines depicted in the map goes up from 56 to 58.
The net changes mask a reduction of five assembly
lines and an addition of seven. It is remarkable how
much farther south the new assembly line openings
are located during this decade compared with the
previous decade. One new assembly line opened in
the heart of the industry, in Lansing, Michigan. Other
than this line, the northernmost assembly line addition
was built in southern Indiana (GG), which represents
the southern edge of the traditional east–west auto belt
(see figure 1). By the same token, a second band of
assembly lines was established at the far southern end
of the auto corridor, reaching from central Mississippi
to South Carolina. These assembly lines were built
exclusively in greenfield locations—that is, in places
where no major auto production or any other manu-
facturing facility had existed at the time.13
Finally, figure 4 displays the noticeably different
densities of domestically owned and foreign-owned
assembly line locations in the eastern half of the U.S.
at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Figure 4,
panel A shows the assembly lines of domestic producers
in 2003. The distribution of the density measure very
closely resembles the one from figure 1—that is, the
traditional assembly region that is oriented east–west,
with Detroit at its center. In contrast, assembly lines
of foreign-headquartered assembly companies in fig-
ure 4, panel B are neatly arrayed in a region that has
a clear north–south extension to it, with Detroit being
just one of many locations.
Parts suppliers
Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of supplier
plant density at the beginning and at the end of the
period we study. Very similar to the case of assembly
lines, the most densely covered region of supplier plants
can be seen as pulling back from the East Coast and
extending farther south. The supplier industry, how-
ever, is characterized by many more plants covering
the vast majority of counties in the eastern half of the
U.S. Figure 7 demonstrates the differences in the
density measures of domestically owned and foreign-
owned supplier plants in 2003. Since there are fewer
foreign-owned supplier plants than domestically owned
ones, figure 7, panel B naturally has a larger share of
counties without a supplier plant within 50 miles, com-
pared with figure 7, panel A. Very similar to the own-
ership breakdown for assembly lines (see figure 4),
figure 7 documents the fact that the density of foreign-
owned supplier plants differs from that of domestically
FIGURE 4
Assembly line density in 2003, by ownership
Sources: ELM International and assembly company websites.
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